Midway 1942 - Turning-point in The Pacific

In the history of war there have been few military operations in which the trilling material damage inflicted on an enemy has been so totally outweighed by its attendant psychological impact, and the ensuing strategic consequences, as in the Doolittle raid on Japan on 18 April 1942. The audacity of the raid served to demonstrate that, in spite of the remarkable victories that had been achieved by the Imperial Army and Navy in South East Asia since the outbreak of war, the United States remained capable of striking at the heart of the Japanese empire, ridiculing the pretension that territorial conquest had in any way rendered the homeland inviolable. The Japanese nation's outrage at the raid was compounded by the loss of face experienced by the Imperial Navy. It saw its ability to exercise responsibility for the defence of the seas around Japan, and thereby ensure the safety of the Emperor, impugned. These sentiments were echoed by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, whose own concern to prevent Tokyo being attacked from the air verged on the obsessional. 'One has the embarrassing feeling; of having been caught napping just when one was feeling confident and in charge of things,' he said. lEven though there wasn't much damage, it is a disgrace that the skies of the Imperial capital should have been defiled without a single enemy plane being shot down.' More significantly, while the Japanese authorities outwardly ridiculed the attack as the 'do-nothing' or 'do-little' raid, the collective disquiet of the Naval General Stall and the planners of the Combined fleet was sufficient to end their irresolution concerning the detailed timetable appending the decision to launch Operation Ml.
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